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INTRODUCTION
The mistranslations of Magic" which led to the crisisin 1941 were influ-
enced by misunderstanding and misperception, and the persistence of
stereotypes and "images" within the parties involved. The study of
these kinds of phenomena has been an important part of the growth of
the discipline of International Relations since the Second World War.
John Farrell and Asa Smith have expressed the need "to consider the
subjective dimension in international conflict, to understand how and
why the images held in other nations may differ from our own".21 Once
they are formed, as Robert Jervis says, "[these] images become overgen-
eralized as expectations established from behavior in one set of circum-
stances are carried out into quite different situations".3'
This thesis is concerned mainly with existing preconceptions and
assumptions, which can be seen as important factors influencing the
mistranslations and misperceptions of the Magic material. The detailed
－124(175)－
－123(176)－
mistranslations and their influence on decision-making during the
talks oflate 1941 have been analysed in a previous thesis entitled "Mis-
translation of Decoded 'Magic' Messages as a Contributing Factor in the
Breakdown of U.S. - Japan Peace Talks in 1941" in Seijo University
Economics Papers (Keizai Kenkyu Hi^fijF^) No. 136, published by The
Economics Institute of Seijo University. Both these theses are based on
a comprehensive study by the author in his doctoral dissertation at the
University of Oxford, 1994.4)
COMPARISON WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
It is easy to identify certain general factors which led to a crisis situ-
ation by 1941: ideological differences between the two countries, the
difference in their strategies in foreign affairs,their mutually incompat-
ible national interests, the endless political disputes and criticism
which arose between the two sides, and the considerable internal dis-
cord within both countries. An international crisis,however, need not
always develop into an actual war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 il-
lustrates this significant point. One can identify several factors, such as
ideological differences between the sides, the difference of the partici-
pants' foreign strategies, etc.,which resemble factors in the U.S.-Japan
crisis of the early 1940s.
In fact, since the end of the Cold War, it has become known how
dangerously close to war the situation came during the Cuban crisis.
That is because it has been analysed on a day-by-day basis with the co-
－122(177)－
operation of the participants, of politicians who were actually involved
in the events, and of scholars from the United States, the former Soviet
Union and Cuba. A Third World War, however, in contrast with the Pa-
cific War, did not break out. In other words, in addition to the root
causes of the U.S.-Japan crisis, a further element was added ; the mis-
understanding arising from Magic. The comparison with the Cuban cri-
sis is the more apposite given the importance of communication be-
tween Washington and Moscow and the fact that its limitations led to
the establishment of the telephone hot-line between the two capitals.5'
CONTRASTING VIEWS OF "MAGIC"
The traditional view of Magic is perhaps best exemplified by Roberta
Wohlstetter in "Pearl Harbor―Warning and Decision", published in
1962 : "The ability to read these codes gave the United States a remark-
able advantage over the enemy". "They knew in advance the diplomatic
moves that Japan was contemplating"6'. Her work is possibly the most
prestigious in its field and is widely accepted as authoritative.71 As she
herself states, "Even Magic was not magical in its properties ;its inter-
pretation required subtlety and political good sense",8' but she has no
knowledge of Japanese and did not examine the decoding and transla-
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tion of Japanese diplomatic traffic.She is not, therefore, checking the
accuracy of translation and then applying "subtlety and political good
sense". Rather she starts with a preconception of Japanese intentions
and then approaches the intercepts from a point of view which has al-
ready been formed. She uncritically accepts the accuracy of the aggres-
sive "tone" of the translations and notes "how they [the messages from
Tokyo] differed in tone from the messages coming out of the Japanese
embassy in Washington".9'
She accepts the repeated assertion of Alwin D. Kramer, chief of the
section of Naval Intelligence in charge of the decoding, that "the Japa-
nese tended to describe desperate situations in a milder way than they
were really thinking".10'There is no evidence for such a statement, but it
led Kramer in the early 1940s, and Wohlstetter some twenty years later,
to believe that the translation rendered should have been harder than
the literal translation. Wohlstetter goes further, stating generally that
"our own MAGIC translation was milder than the original".11'There is
the hint here of a general perception of Japanese as a subtle, under-
stated language that needs to be "corrected" to a stronger version to
convey the writer's real intention.
A fluent Japanese speaker, however, such as Jay Rubin, Professor
of Japanese Literature at the University of Washington, points out that
this is just an assumption which is part of the myth of Japanese
"uniqueness". He states that "Japanese is not the language of the infi-
nite. Japanese is not even vague ...The Japanese speak and write to
each other as other literate peoples do ..."12)
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Even until fairly recently, the image of Magic persists. Ronald
Lewin, without any critical examination, described, as late as 1983,
"the picture of Japan painted by Magic : a country engaged with ruth-
less and devouring energy in pursuing its own interests, and not to be
deflected from that pursuit"13' and "If Magic did nothing else, it never
ceased to warn about Japan's hard, incessant and (for all her cosmetic
tricks of diplomacy) inflexible drive toward an act of aggression ...some-
where".14'
In 1988, however, in a commentary attached to the translation of
Lewin's work, Takao Tokuoka IMM^^ notes that "With regard to the
episode of decoded intercepts ...Most of the mistranslations twisted the
intentions of the Japanese government [making them] more war-like
than they were". He goes further, saying that "[Secretary of State Cor-
dell Hull] read in advance the intercepts which contained a number of
mistranslations, and resented Japan's duplicity. Such a resentment
therefore could not have been caused if such intercepts had not ex-
isted".15'
Ted Morgan, writing a biography of Roosevelt without (understand-
ably) any knowledge of Japanese, stillinsisted in 1985 : "Hull, who saw
Nomura [Japanese Ambassador to Washington Kichisaburo Nomura if
^tlcf^Jtft] almost daily, was shocked by the contrast between his protes-
tation of peaceful intentions and the contents of the Magic messages ...
Hull... knew from the inflamed tone of the Magic intercepts that Japan
was preparing for war".16'
In 1977, Michael Blaker of Columbia University, who has extended
his study of original Japanese texts covering eighteen cases of pre-war
Japanese diplomacy,17' reaches a confident conclusion in his publication :
"The materials examined for this study do not support an image of
Japanese diplomats as devious and underhanded. This popular stereo-
type seems both unwarranted and undeserved. Japanese statements
made during decision-making meetings in Tokyo closely resembled
those made both in public and to the other side during bargaining ...
even if they may not have been believable to outside observers".18' The
contrast in the conclusions reached through two lines of historical study,
the one based on an expert and scholarly examination of the texts and
the other proceeding from received ideas without any such study, is
sharply obvious.
Some Japanese writers, including Professor Toshikazu Kase #0$!^
-~ and Professor Shinji Sudo ^jfIi§iH;S,have also noted the negative role
of the Magic mistranslations in worsening U.S.-Japan relations prior to
the outbreak of the conflict.19'However, they have not concentrated on
the particular effect of these mistranslations on the peace talks.
Roberta Wohlstetter is aware that several observers have pointed
out the issue of misinterpretations in Magic. She states that "They [the
Japanese] have pointed out ...how their secret diplomatic messages
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were incorrectly interpreted because our decoders had not translated
them accurately",20' but she has regarded it as merely "Japanese re-
sponses to American criticism" centring "on justification of this particu-
lar part of their war plan [Pearl Harbor attack]", and emphasises that
"The point of such exchanges [including the argument of misinterpreta-
tion] becomes largely irrelevant if the basic Japanese war plan is con-
sidered" on "the basis of the Japanese data made available since the
close of the war".2"
The same writer, however, asserts inconsistently in the same work,
sixteen years after the publication of a large part of the original mes-
sages in Japanese : "Our decision-makers were dependent on the trans-
lations with which they were presented, and the present analysis will
be confined to the signals in that form".22) Thus, it has been acceptable
to continue to refuse to examine the original texts and compare them
with the translated version, and at the same time to dismiss any argu-
ment on the misinterpretation issue as being merely an apologist view.
Under the circumstances, on the Japanese side questions are evaded in
the general literature partly for this reason, namely the continuing sen-
sitivitywith regard to pre-war events in Japanese politics and culture.
HUDDLESTON'S WORK AND THE RELEASE OF THE
MAGIC FILES
A year after Wohlstetter's publication, Jackson Noyes Huddleston Jr. of
the University of Washington attempted in an unpublished thesis to an-
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alyse the Magic materials in depth, comparing them with the Japanese
originals and concentrated on revealing the seriousness of the mistrans-
lations and misinterpretations in the light of their significance in inter-
rupting the efforts to reach an agreement between the United States
and Japan.23' His analysis led him "to conclude tentatively that Ambas-
sador Nomura followed Foreign Minister Togo's instructions quite
closely and was a good representative of his country's policy".24'
The unusual difficulties which Huddleston faced at that time were
stated in his thesis :
In order to judge the quality of intercepts and decoding, one would
have to have access to the MAGIC file.The location of this fileis not
exactly known. It is somewhere in an Intelligence library in or near
Washington, D.C. Mrs. Roberta Wohlstetter, whose definitive study
on Pearl Harbor was published last year, informed me that the
MAGIC file exists but added : "What you should know is that access
to MAGIC will automatically disqualify you for writing or speaking
on the subject. This is a strict rule of Intelligence. It took me about a
year to be convinced about this ...".25)
Under these circumstances, he eventually decided to give up pub-
lishing his work in 1963. Consequently, it has not been made public up
to the present. In this context, the author thinks it worthwhile to intro-
duce part of his work in this thesis, since some part of his work is still
important despite the later publication of "The 'Magic' Background of
Pearl Harbor" in 1978 by the Department of Defense in Washington,
and the subsequent declassification of the original Magic materials.
Although the original Magic documents were finally declassified
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under Executive Order 12065, authorised by President Carter, and
scholarly attention was paid to them immediately afterwards, there are
stillseriousdifficultiesas stated by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave :
In 1980, the U.S. National Security Agency suddenly declassified
over 130,000 pages of wartime Magic decrypts. This was done in a
haphazard fashion so that researchers were confronted with march-
ing rows of anonymous gray cardboard boxes on the thirteenth floor
of the National Archives in Washington. As these were in no particu-
lar order,it was a matter ofluck that anyone came across anything of
interest.26'
BACKGROUND OF MISPERCEPTIONS
The translation of the Magic material, as well as its interpretation by
those who saw it, must be set in the context of the mutual apprehen-
sions and misperceptions which existed between the two sidesin the pe-
riod leading up to the peace negotiations. The role of stereotyped im-
ages can also be discerned in these specificareas of contention.
APPOINTMENT OF TO JO CABINET
One event which caused serious misgivings in the U.S. was the appoint-
ment of General Hideki Tojo Mifc-^W. as Head of the Cabinet (Shuhan
USE) in October 1941. He was proposed by the Lord Keeper ofthe Privy
Seal Koichi Kido 7fyF^?― and this was adopted by the conference of the
former prime ministers, Jushin Kaigi SE^fR (literallythe conference
of the "senior statesmen"). On the basis of several materials, including
Kido's Diary written at that time, the proposal of Tojo as Head had the
following aims.27)
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First, he was regarded as a capable leader who could effectively
"conduct" both the Army and Navy, which had previously tended to act
independently of each other. Second, Tojo was expected to be capable of
leading the government's reconsideration of the policy document enti-
tled "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies", Teikoku
Kokusaku Yoko ^tBSjjIIcIP!, from the "Imperial Conference", Gozen
Kaigi f^PfiJ2s!ii,28)of September 6th, which had decided on preparation
for war against the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in case of a fail-
ure to reach a diplomatic agreement within the period up to the middle
of October.29'
It was also decided at the Jushin Kaigi that the new Head of the
Cabinet Tojo should take on the positions of Army Minister and Home
Minister, while stillserving as Army commander, to solve the continu-
ing political problem of lack of control. However, it has become clear
that this problem was so intractable that he was unable to succeed,
partly because he was not given enough authority to control the Navy.30)
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Whatever the American perception of the formation on October
20th of the new Tojo Cabinet was, the Japanese leaders' intention in
forming it was, thus, to abolish the policy of opening hostilities in late
October and to continue peace efforts through negotiations with the U.S.
and Britain.311In fact, some Americans, including Ambassador Joseph
Grew who accurately reported to Washington on the 20th about Japa-
nese intentions in the formation of the new cabinet, realised the true
meaning of the appearance of Tojo.32>
While some American leaders, for instance Brigadier General Sher-
man Miles of the Army in his memorandum of October 17th, regarded
Tojo as a very aggressive pro-German militarist, other leaders includ-
ing William Langton in his memorandum of the 17th and Maxwell
Hamilton in his memorandum of the 18th, both in the Far Eastern Divi-
sion of the State Department, predicted the possibility of success under
the new Tojo Cabinet in reaching an agreement for peace.33' One should
recognise here that when the Tojo Cabinet began, there were leaders on
both sides who were stillattempting to solve the U.S.-Japan conflicts
through diplomatic means and who predicted the possibility of success.
JAPAN AND GERMANY
A significant point is that many American leaders including Langton
and Hamilton at this stage regarded the Tojo Cabinet as being pro-Ger-
man and pro-Tripartite Alliance by pointing out that Tojo was a former
attache to Germany, that Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo MMrftW* as
the former ambassador to Germany and that his wife was German.
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Similarly, Hull expressed his deep suspicion of the posting of Ambassa-
dor Saburo Kurusu 5f£fi§Ei$[$to Washington in November, emphasising
his role as the former Japanese Ambassador to Germany.34' As is noted
by Professor S. Sudo, however, the Japanese leaders could not imagine
that such a strong impression would be given to the Americans from
these profiles.35'Abraham Ben-Zvi of the Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem points out that the Americans "ignored those which might have in-
dicated a different impression, such as that Kurusu had served in the
Japanese consular service in the United States, and that his wife was
American".36' The Japanese thus underestimated the American authori-
ties' hostility to Nazi Germany, while to some extent the Americans
overestimated the link between Japan and Germany.
In fact, Secretary of State Hull, for example, states even in his work
published after the end of the Pacific War:
We knew from our intercepts of Japanese Government messages how
strong was the German pressure being applied in Tokyo. One such
message, of October 16, from Toyoda to Nomura, stated that the Ger-
man authorities were demanding that the Japanese Government sub-
mit a note of warning to the United States. The Germans were
aroused over the President's "shoot on sight" order of September 11,
the incidents that had already occurred between German and Ameri-
can vessels, and the possibility that the Neutrality Act would be
amended.37'
However, Eugen Ott, German ambassador to Tokyo, sent a report
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to Berlin on the 28th, 12 days after the message of the 16th from For-
eign Minister TeijiroToyoda HEH j|-^Cll[$to Ambassador Nomura, saying
that the Japanese government had not yet submitted such a note of
warning to the United States, after Ott met new Foreign Minister
Togo.38'
German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had already re-
quested that Japan attack British Singapore at a meeting with Hiroshi
Oshima ~XMia, Ambassador to Germany, on February 23rd, 1941.
Then, on March 4th, Ambassador Ott again urged Japan to attack Sin-
gapore as soon as possible,but General Hajime Sugiyama #|i|7C, Chief
of Staff of the Army, responded negatively. On March 27th Adolph
Hitler once more requested an attack on Singapore when he met For-
eign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka f&MW^5 on his visitto Germany, but
Japan, instead of complying, opened the U.S.-Japan peace talks in
April.
Consequently, the U.S.-Japan Draft Understanding Proposal,
Nichibei Ryokai-an B ^W-M^, ofApril 16th itselfwas reported by Ott
on May 5th as an attempt to end the effectiveness of the Tripartite
Pact.39'After the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the German gov-
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ernment repeatedly requested the Japanese government, on June 30th
and July 2nd, to attack Russia, but the Japanese government decided
on a non-participation policyin the Russo-German War at the Gozen
Kaigi of July 2nd. Thus, the persistent requests from the German gov-
ernment to the Japanese government did not necessarily mean that the
Japanese government was constrained in its decision-making towards
the U.S.-Japan peace talks by German pressure at that time. While the
Japanese did not fullyunderstand that the Americans were already in-
volved in realityin the undeclared naval war against Germany in the
Atlantic,the Americans over-emphasised the link between Japan's de-
cision-making and pressure from Germany.
Later, Japan had sought and been given a formal guarantee on De-
cember 5th that Germany would enter the war against the U.S., but it
was not a factor to which any importance was given in Japanese deci-
sion-making, although it would have been an advantage to have Ger-
man co-operation. Japan's formal decision to attack Pearl Harbor had
already been made on the 1st of the same month, several days before
the German guarantee was received.401It is known that Germany was
not informed about Japan's plan until the attack began, so that "Pearl
Harbor came as a surprise to Hitler".41)Before the attack on Pearl Har-
bor Hitler was increasingly impatient with U.S. support for Britain and
"was coming to the conclusion that a virtual state of war already existed
with the U.S.A."42) Moreover, he had his own reasons for deciding to de-
clare war on the United States. He underestimated the strength of the
United States and he was determined that the Russian counter-offen-
sive launched on December 5th/6th should be resisted. Thus, independ-
ently from German pressure, Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor
was influenced mainly by developments in the course of the U.S.-Japan
peace talks.
ATTACK TO THE NORTH OR TO THE SOUTH?
In addition, it is important to remember that the vital question of
whether Japan might have fought against the Russians in the North in-
stead of opening hostilities against the Western Allies in the southern
and eastern regions was still open at this stage. As noted by Professor
Waldo Heinrichs, "[Prime Minister] General Tojo Hideki, previously
war minister ...was known for his 'particular dislike of the Russians'
and his prediction in 1938 that Japan would have to fight the Soviet
Union". As late as October the U.S. stillthought that there was more
likelihood of a Japanese Army attack against the Soviet Far Eastern
Army in the North.
On October 17th high-ranking Chinese military officers predicted
an attack by the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchukuo (Manchuria)
against the Soviet Siberian Army "in a few days". U.S. Army intelli-
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gence judged the Kwantung Army and the Siberian Army to be roughly
matched as a result of a reduction in Soviet Far Eastern military forces
and Japanese military movements towards the North, but that a fur-
ther reduction of the Soviet forces would lead to a Japanese attack. The
U.S. Navy under the influence of Admiral Kelly Turner warned that
hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union were now a "strong pos-
sibility". Roosevelt himself repeatedly stated his concern about the
northern front in the Far East. On October 10th he told British Ambas-
sador Lord Halifax that he feared a Japanese attack on Vladivostok,
and on the 15th he wrote to Winston Churchill that the "Jap situation"
was "definitely worse" and that the Japanese were "headed North".43'
Even in the following month, the figures of the military and naval
summaries on November 1st, for instance, stressed the disposition of
Japanese forces for a possible Russian attack; "The Japanese forces in
Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia, disposed for attack upon Rus-
sia, are very reliably reported to have been increased to 684,000", while
the same source on November 15th reported a further diminution in the
number of Japanese troops in the southern area ; "Itis believed that ac-
tually there are about 60,000 Japanese troops in Indo-China".44'
In fact, as observed by Makoto Ikuta ^feBBt? of the Military History
Department (Senshi-shitsu Hc5ii=ID of the National Institute for De-
fence Studies of the Defence Agency, the number of Japanese troops in
the northern front, both in Manchuria and Korea, in the Kan-Toku-En
H#?l[ (the Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvres) was increasing rap-
idly towards the beginning of November to about 800,000 in total. In
contrast, the number of Japanese troops in the southern and eastern ar-
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eas facing the Western Allied forces was less than 100,000 during the
same period, and even by the date of the outbreak of the Pacific War,
that number had increased to only 150,000, while 740,000 were still
stationed on the northern front.45'In this sense, U.S. military intelli-
gence seems to have successfully obtained accurate information about
the shift of the Japanese Army towards the North.46'
On the basis of this information, the U.S. Army estimated on No-
vember 2nd that Japan's "most probable line of action ...will be to con-
tinue her efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure,
while completing her plans ..."although what "her plans" were was not
clearly predicted. By comparing this conclusion with the Japanese pri-
mary sources, one can clearly recognise that U.S. military intelligence
described contemporary Japanese intentions quite accurately,47' al-
though some historians including Wohlstetter regard American intelli-
gence as merely unrealistic optimism : "This commitment [of the report
of November 2nd] ...was stillguided by the optimism that characterized
the October predictions of MID [Military Intelligence Division of the U.
S.Army]".485
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the Kan-Toku-En
Manoeuvres did not end until the early summer of 1942, several months
after Pearl Harbor, and the material published by the Military History
Department in 1974 clearly proves the existence of quite precise war
plans against the Russian Siberian Army, with a number of military
maps of the region showing in detail a possible war of the summer of
1942.49! A significant indication of the extremely high tension in the
North is the fact that more than 1,600 Russo-Japanese military con-
flicts were reported from the mid 1930s up to the end of the Pacific
War50' although the official Russian war declaration of 1945 was an-
nounced only six days before the end of the War. A number of historians
have overlooked the significant developments throughout this period in
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the North.51' Ted Morgan, for instance, over-emphasises the "stability"
in the North, making the extraordinary statement that "Never, until
August 1945, did a Russian soldier fight a Japanese soldier".52)As Pro-
fessor Toshihiko Shimada HBEHi£0 observes, the volume of ammunition
sent to the northern front was so large that a half of it remained when
the War ended, even though much of it was increasingly sent to the
southern fronts as the fight against the Western Allied forces escalated
throughout the four-year period of war in the Pacific.53'
From a strategic point of view, therefore, some historians have
questioned in retrospect America's coercive posture, starting with the
embargoes, and particularly the ban on oil shipments towards Japan
from August. As emphasised by Professor Waldo Heinrichs, the Japa-
nese Army was eventually "of one mind on the necessity for attack
southward including war with the United States" because "Even propo-
nents of an attack northward were converted by the necessity of first se-
curing adequate resources in the South".54' Similarly, Professor of Politi-
cal Science Anthony Kubek notes that "Invasion of Siberia ...offered no
material advantage to Japan, other than a purely military one. Japan
needed oil, and, with the United States constantly applying economic
pressure, it was to [the] Japanese advantage to move in the direction of
Southeast Asia, where oilwas available. This was the view strongly ad-
vocated by the Japanese naval officials,who opposed simultaneous war
with the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union".55'
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According to the Japanese primary source, the Army traditionally
had its main concern in the northern border, i.e. the threat from the
Russians from the early modern period to the years of the Pacific War.
The Americans' primary interest, particularly for the Roosevelt admini-
stration, was the German threat in Europe. The important question
arises here whether the national interests of the U.S. and Japan con-
flicted seriously enough to warrant fighting over in the Pacific region.
MILITARY PLANS AND MOVEMENTS
The Japanese advance southwards to southern French Indo-China was
also partly a response to the so-called ADB report made at a conference
known as ADB-1, the American, Dutch and British military staff con-
ference (ADB), convened in Singapore in April 1941. The conference de-
termined their pre-conditions for war against Japan, and proposed "to
attack Japan itself with long-range bombers, a form of violent economic
pressure that would bring about its collapse more surely ...than grad-
ual denial of resources".56' Although the ADB report was later rejected
by the Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark and the Army Chief of
Staff George C. Marshall in early July, the Japanese Army felt a seri-
ous threat posed by the explicit "united front". Consequently, on May
1st, the Ministry of the Army began to make a plan to advance to the
South using military force if necessary. In this context, the plan was, in
the Army's view, a means for Japan's national survival in the event of
strict Allied sanctions.57'
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Thus, the Japanese felt a threat despite the fact that the Allies'
strategies were in reality defensive rather than offensive, with a few ex-
ceptions not endorsed by the authorities. Churchill had in reality no
prospect of holding the British territories in the region in the event of
Japan's involvement in a war,58'and the U.S. had already made the Ger-
many-first and Pacific defensive decisions in 1940. The American po-
litical decision was consequently a "global strategy that urged acceler-
ated re-armament and avoiding provocations of Japan such as overt al-
liances, economic sanctions, or sending arms to China".59'
Whatever the current retrospective view, according to those pri-
mary sources, most of the members of the Japanese Army and Navy in
fact regarded their own plan as "defensive" rather than "offensive"
while they thought of the allies'strategy as more offensive, and there-
fore they felt a serious sense of national crisis at that time.60'This was
exactly the same stance as that seen among most of the contemporary
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Western leaders who believed their own strategies were "defensive",
while regarding the Japanese strategies as "offensive". Thus, the con-
temporary leaders of both sides could not get precise information about
the intentions of the opposition but got only very limited information
and could only interpret from reports of the adversary's actions. The
same limited perspective can stillbe seen in the publications of the post
-war period. In his work of 1961, Professor Robert Butow dismissed the
Magic mistranslations as having no importance, insisting that the U.S.
was guided by Japanese actions, not words.61' This kind of perception
gap has occurred very naturally and universally in the history of inter-
national relations, particularly under this type of hostile atmosphere.
Thus, they understood the same events differently.
In mid-October of 1941, the U.S. Navy entered stage one ofits War
Plan of the Pacific Fleet (WPPac 46). This plan was based on the older
WPL46, the War Plan of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
known as Rainbow Five, which was the contingency war plan for an at-
tack on Japan; stage one to start before the opening of hostilities, stage
two just after the beginning of a war, and stage three from then on. As a
part of stage one of the contingency plan, the Eighth Fleet led by Vice-
Admiral William Halsey and the Twelfth Fleet left Pearl Harbor, send-
ing planes out to the Pacific islands.62'Also, on November 21st, General
Douglas MacArthur received the "Offensive Air Operations", the re-
vised Rainbow Five War Plan.63'Although these actions could be seen by
an adversary as relatively hostile, it should be recognised that they
were actually only a preparation for the possibility of war.
Meanwhile the Japanese Task Force carried out manoeuvres from
November 4th to the 6th, based on the contingency plan to attack Pearl
Harbor,64) while the Gozen Kaigi adopted the "Guidelines for Imple-
menting National Policies".65'The Navy issued a series of orders to pre-
pare for the possibility of war with the U.S., in each case followed by a
proviso that the attack would be aborted if the U.S.^Japan negotiations
were successful.66'Thus, neither side's military movements and actions
observed at this stage were evidence of a determination to go to war.
That depended on the outcome of the diplomatic talks.
AMBASSADOR GREW
In contrast to the inaccurate perceptions of the majority of decision-
makers, Ambassador Grew had maintained quite reliable sources of in-
formation on Japan's intentions, while naturally making every effort to
keep his original source secret. In his work entitled "Ten Years in Ja-
pan" of 1944, for instance, he carefully omitted several Japanese per-
sonal names although they had been recorded as sources in his original
diary. He even deliberately confused Admiral Zengo Yoshida iifEB Hilr
and Shigeru Yoshida "n'BBJ^ of the Foreign Office by mentioning only
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the family name in his work.67) Although Herbert Feis emphasises that
"Grew was moved by portents, not by evidence",68' Grew stayed in Japan,
and, as has been revealed by post-war examination, often obtained sur-
prisingly accurate information, including the precise dialogue of the
Gozen Kaigi of September 6th, 1941. The source of such information, as
pointed out by Sudo, is not yet known by historians.69' Heinrichs, how-
ever, notes that "the Tokyo Embassy played no part in the Japanese-
American diplomacy oflate November. His (Grew's) advice was neither
asked nor given. He was not informed of the various ...proposals ...and
he did not comment on them".70'
The evaluation of Grew's view in the historical context has been
controversial. However, even Herbert Feis states that "It will be always
possible to think that Grew was correct"71',although, as pointed out by
Robert Dallek, Feis's work has been labelled as an "officialhistory" be-
cause "of its sympathetic portrayal of the Roosevelt Administration's
politics",72'and although Feis himself expressed his view that "the re-
cords ...do not support the belief that a real chance of maintaining
peace in the Pacific ...was missed".731 More sympathetically, Akira Iriye
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of Harvard University states that "Had the embassy [in Tokyo] been
given more leeway ...it is not inconceivable that the Japanese military
might have retained some hope that the China War could be settled
without inviting open conflict with the United States".74'
In fact, Grew's insistence on a cautious posture up to the end is sig-
nificant, when taking into account that, as General Marshall empha-
sised in his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigat-
ing the attack on Pearl Harbor, "ifthe 90-day truce had been effected,
the United States might never have become involved in the [Pacific]
war at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941, into
January, 1942, might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as
to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front
before Moscow in December, 1941"75) and that, as Anthony Kubek ob-
serves, "A growing conviction existed in Japanese military circles that
Germany was in a death struggle in her war with Russia [in the winter
ofl941-2]".76)
However, Grew had, as already mentioned, littleinfluence in the
formation of the American foreign policy towards Japan in the most cru-
cial period, and the following episode, which was related by Grew in an
interview with Walter Johnson in 1949, symbolises the seriousness of
the lack of his influence : Following the outbreak of war, Grew "had
talked to Hull and asked why Konoye's [Prime Minister Fumimaro
Konoe jftftf^li] proposal of a visit with Roosevelt [offered in August]
had not been accepted" since "he [Grew] felt that such a meeting might
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have brought peace". Hull replied, "If you thought so strongly, why did-
n't you board a plane and come to tell us?" Grew reminded Hull "of the
daily telegrams which he had sent explaining the situation and his feel-
ing about it" and "It was at this point... that he wondered whether Mr.
Hull had been given and had read all of the despatches from Tokyo".77'
Magic again played a crucial role in this matter, as observed by Mi-
chael Barnhart; "Everyone in Washington believed that it [Magic] pro-
vided incontrovertible evidence of the Imperial Conference decisions of
2 July. So Grew's cries for flexibility ...were ignored", and "Magic com-
bined with old but still-vital preconceptions of the Japanese as beelike,
incapable ofinternal differences, and Grew's constantly discredited pre-
dictions ...made little sense" in the effort to avoid war. Barnhart con-
cludes that "In this belief, Magic played a vital and tragic role".78)
Grew was eventually promoted to Director of the Office of Far East-
ern Affairs of the State Department in May 1944 and played a very im-
portant role in the formation of the U.S. policy towards Japan after-
wards, both towards the end of the War and after the War was over, but
was not given enough opportunity before the outbreak of the War.79'
THE SITUATION IN LATE 1941
In late November 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, neither the Japanese
Navy nor the Army could foresee any possibility of final victory in the
event of a war with the U.S.80'In practical terms, "final victory" under
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these circumstances necessarily implied at least the permanent secur-
ing of oil supply routes without subsequent threat from the U.S. and
Britain, and at most the actual military occupation of Washington D.C.
itself.In awareness of this impasse, the Japanese were in a sense inexo-
rably led to the miscalculated attack on Pearl Harbor based on the as-
sumption that the U.S. might compromise ifits Pacific Fleet was largely
destroyed.
At the same time, the American Navy and the Army both requested
their government "to keep Japan out of the war"81>,or at least "to delay
matters" for three months until March 1942 to enable them to prepare
for war with Japan.82' "Yet", as Professor Russell Weigley states, "the
war came. It came in part because the civildepartments of the U.S. gov-
ernment formulated policy toward Japan with littleregard for the mili-
tary capacities and limitations of the United States in the western Pa-
cific".83'Thus, neither side showed any real confidence in its readiness to
engage in military conflictin the Pacific.
As noted in the preceding thesis, the later stages of the crisis were
really precipitated by the exchange and misinterpretation of proposals
by both sides, namely the "Plan for Negotiation with the U.S." (Taibei
Kosho Yoryo M^^ci^^vM), consisting of Proposal A (ko-an ^^) and
Proposal B (otsu-an Zl.^)84'prepared in early November by Japan, and
on the American side the so-called "Hull Note" presented by Secretary
of State Cordell Hull to Japan in late November. The most important
point of the latter was the omission of the "modus vivendi", which was
in effect a temporary compromise that could have delayed any action
until March of the following year. The probability has to be recognised
that Japan would have lost the opportunity to choose a suitable time to
open hostilities against the U.S. if the Pearl Harbor plan had been post-
poned until March 1942, for the following reasons.
Firstly, the Japanese pro-German group might have lost their in-
fluence, since by that time the German forces were facing their first ma-
jor defeat against the Red Army on the Moscow front. Secondly, Japan
would have used up nearly half of her six month stock of oil for military
use during the modus vivendi period from December to the following
March. Although the modus vivendi was postulated on the resumption
of oil supplies, in fact it spoke specifically of "lower-grade petroleum
products in quantities appropriate to civilian use". Thirdly, Japan's mo-
tivation for opening hostilities would have been reduced if the modus vi-
vendi had been offered, since a version of it consisted of conditions
which were more or less acceptable to the Japanese, as may be seen
from the fact that they were actually pleased with those conditions
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when they intercepted and read them85) before the American decision to
remove them from the Hull Note. In fact Japan decided, at the confer-
ence of the Liaison Council of November 24th, on several procedures for
the preparation of a trade treaty with the U.S. in the event of a success-
ful result of the talks.86'On the 25th, one day before the removal of the
modus vivendi, Foreign Minister Togo prepared the drafts of official"re-
ciprocal documents" both with Britain and with the Netherlands, and
also a draft announcement for the newspapers in the event of an agree-
ment being reached.87'
Again, as analysed in the previous thesis Proposal B, which was of-
fered by the Japanese government in November, could also be taken as
a kind of "modus vivendi" in its original Japanese version, although the
inadequate Magic translation clearly defined it as an "ultimatum". Pro-
posal B in the Magic version of #727 is exaggerated as "the idea of mak-
ing a last effort to prevent something happening", while the phrase "a
last effort" does not exist in the original Japanese text.88'This part of
the original telegram states that "the contents of our second proposal
[Proposal B]" was "drawn up with the thought in mind that it is better
to prevent something from happening before it arises". Thus, the origi-
nal text indicates that the purpose in preparing Proposal B was not to
present Japan's "last" proposal, but rather to prevent a breakdown in
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the negotiations. As Huddleston notes, "The concept of a modus vivendi
is clearly expressed in the 'original'".89'
Also, as pointed out by Professor T. Kase there was an agreement
between Prime Minister Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo that they
would not regard proposals A and B as the final ones in the event of a
positive American response.90' This is where the significant role played
by Magic mistranslations should be noted.
"CRISIS MANAGEMENT"
"Crisis Management" has recently become a popular area of debate, in
both the press and academic circles, where its consideration has been
applied to the history of international relations. It is clear that in the
kind of negotiating situation examined here, where effective "crisis
management" is essential, at least three distinct procedural steps need
to be taken : collecting relevant information, determining its accuracy,
and assessing its relative importance in the decision-making process.
In the case of Magic information, none of these steps has been fully at-
tempted, even to this day.
Few of the events which form the subject matter of both this and
the previous thesis are unknown to historians; all have been studied in
one way or another. The claim made for the two theses is that, by mak-
ing a comprehensive, systematic study of both American and Japanese
decision-making in close detail, the author has been able to demon-
strate how misunderstanding was a contributory factor in the causation
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The Role of"Magic" Distortionsin "CrisisManagement" During
of a war which neither side wanted.
Over fifty years after Pearl Harbor, some revision of different his-
torical views is taking place, and much of the publication has been jour-
nalistic, owing to the media's interest in the anniversary. Considering
that only a very small number of the scholarly works in Japanese have
been translated into English,9" one should recognise that the factor of
linguistic barriers and deep-rooted misperceptions stillexists between
the U.S. and Japan. This is a good moment to take advantage, in a criti-
cal manner, of the opportunity to combine the Western works and the
new Japanese research.
